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ATTORNEYS' FEES IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
CITIZEN SUITS: SHOULD PREVAILING 
DEFENDANTS RECOVER? 
KERRY D. FLORIO* 
Attorneys' fees in environmental citizen suits enable private citizens to 
enforce environmental legislation. First introduced in the federal Clean Air 
Act, attorney s fee provisions are now included in virtually all environ-
mental legislation. Without provisions for the award of attorneys' fees, legis-
lation allowing for private citizen enforcement would be practically mean-
ingless. Attorneys' fees provisions typically allow for prevailing parties to be 
awarded attorneys' fees when it is "appropriate. " The appropriateness stan-
dard has routinely justified awarding attorneys' fees to prevailing plain-
tiffs, while defendants have commonly been awarded fees only when a suit 
is deemed frivolous, harassing, or without merit. This Comment explores 
how prevailing defendants continue to rely on the language of the applica-
ble statutes to argue that they are entitled to attorneys' fees as prevailing 
parties, and how the principles of equity can provide a better basis for 
awarding attorneys' fees to prevailing defendants. 
INTRODUCTION 
Environmental citizen suits enable and empower citizens to en-
force environmental legislation. 1 These suits are made possible by the 
inclusion of attorneys' fees provisions in virtually all environmental 
statutes.2 Without attorneys' fees provisions, citizens are often unable 
to enforce environmental legislation because the costs of litigation are 
* Articles Editor, 1999-2000, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAw REVIEW. 
1 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994); Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994); Comprehensive Environmental Response. Compensation and 
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 2601-2692 (1994); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-
1328 (1994); see alm ROBERT L. ROSSI, ATTORNEYS' FEES § 10:34, at 696 (2d ed. 1995). 
2 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7G04(d); Endangered Species Act of 
1973, § 11 (g) (4), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (4); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 
1976, § 7002(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e); Safe Drinking Water Act, § 1449 (d) , 42 U.s.C. 
§ 300j-8(d); Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, § 326(f) , 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11046(f). 
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too high.3 Attorneys' fees provisions allow attorneys to represent citi-
zens with the anticipation that defendants will pay their fees if the 
citizen plaintiffs prevai1.4 
Federal legislators enacted citizen suit provisions with attorneys' 
fees provisions in an effort to encourage the enforcement of envi-
ronmental legislation by private citizens or citizen organizations. 
However, defendants are also attempting to obtain attorneys' fees 
from the citizen plaintiffs, whenever they prevail in citizen suits.5 
Statutory language in environmental legislation typically states that 
attorneys' fees may be awarded to "any party" when "appropriate."6 
Plaintiffs, usually non-profit citizen organizations, obtain attorney's 
fee awards when they are the prevailing party in almost all circum-
stances, provided the case was brought in good faith.' 
Historically, defendants have received attorneys' fees only in lim-
ited circumstances.s When considering a fee award for prevailing de-
fendants, courts follow the decision in Christiansburg Garment Company 
v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which held that, under the 
fee-shifting provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, fees 
should not be awarded to prevailing defendants unless the district 
court finds "that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or 
without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad 
faith."9 Defendants, however, often argue that they are entitled to at-
torneys' fees as the prevailing party, not just when a suit is frivolous.l° 
Only one court has awarded a prevailing defendant fees, and it did so 
without any analysis of what standard should be applied. ll 
This Comment examines the development of citizen suits and 
attorneys' fees provisions and suggests that attorneys' fees awards 
should only be made to defendants when they are equitable. Section I 
examines citizen suit provisions and the role citizens play in the en-
forcement of environmental legislation. This section also discusses the 
3 See MICHAEL D. AxLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS § 8.03,8-2 (1995). 
4 See id. 
5 See, e.g., Brief for Defendant, Citizens for a Better Env't v. The Steel Co., No. 95-C-
4534 (9th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Steel Co. Brief]. 
6 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1994). 
7 See JEFFREY G. MILLER & ENVIRONMENTAL LAw INSTITUTE, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE 
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS § 9-4,102 (1987). 
8 See Christiansburg v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978); Carrion v. Yeshiva University, 
535 F.2d 722, 727 (2d Cir. 1976); see also, AxLINE, supra note 3, at 8-14. 
9 Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421. 
10 See generally Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5. 
II See Sierra Club v. Shell Oil, 817 F.2d 1169, 1176 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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impact and importance of attorneys' fees provisions in the develop-
ment and effectiveness of citizen suits. Section II traces the develop-
ment of attorneys' fees provisions in citizen suits and how courts in-
terpret these statutes. Section III discusses arguments defendants 
often make in requesting attorney fee awards. Section IV suggests that 
Congress gave the courts discretion to award fees when equitable or 
"appropriate," and to both plaintiffs and defendants when the court 
determines that the award is equitable in light of the circumstances of 
that case. 
1. CITIZEN SUITS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 
Citizen participation is essential to the enforcement of environ-
mentallegislation.12 Environmental law was not the first area of law to 
include citizen involvement in the enforcement of legislation.13 Prior 
to the enactment of environmental citizen suit provisions, there were 
existing doctrines allowing for the private enforcement of laws such as 
the antitrust treble-damage provision, stockholder derivative suits un-
der the securities law, and the doctrines of private right of action and 
statutory tort.14 Citizen suit provisions in environmental legislation, 
however, were the first provisions empowering private citizens to act as 
"private attorneys general," enforcing statutory rights for the benefit 
of the community as a whole, rather than personal benefit.I5 
Today, citizen enforcement is one of the primary means of en-
forcing environmental legislation.16 Without effective citizen partici-
pation, much of this legislation would simply go unenforced)7 There 
are several reasons why enforcement would be inadequate if citizens 
were prevented from bringing suit. IS First, public officials and agen-
cies do not or are not capable of effectively policing the system due to 
insufficient funds, inadequate staff, or lack of expertise.19 Second, 
12 See George Van Cleve, Congressional Power to Confer Broad Citizen Standing in Environ-
mental Cases, 29 ENVTL. L. REp. 10,028 (1999). 
13 See AxLINE, supra note 3, at 1-2; Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollu-
tion Control Laws, Part J, 13 ENVTL. L. REp. 10,309, 10,309 (1983) [hereinafter Private En-
forcement]. 
14 See Private Enforcement, supra note 13, at 10,309. 
15 See MILLER, supra note 7, at 1. 
16 See Van Cleve, supra note 12, at 10,028. 
17 See Walter B. Russell, III & Paul Thomas Gregory, Awards of Attorneys' Fees in Environ-
mental Litigation: Citizen Suits and the "Appropriate" Standard, 18 GA. L. REv. 307, 324-25 
(1984). 
18 See id. 
19 See id. 
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agencies may be lax or unwilling to aggressively prosecute violators 
due to political pressure, alignment with the special interests those 
agencies are intended to regulate, or because the agencies themselves 
promote the activity that they should be regulating.20 Finally, citizen 
suits reduce the government's enforcement burden.21 Because the 
government has a limited amount of resources with which to enforce 
environmental legislation, encouraging citizen suits permits a greater 
level of enforcement.22 Citizen suits utilize private resources, saving 
the government money and permitting a more efficient administra-
tion of legislative policies.23 
All major federal environmental laws-including the Clean Air 
Act (CAA) ;24 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly 
known as the Clean Water Act (CWA) ;25 the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA) ;26 and the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERClA) 27-contain es-
sentially the same citizen suit provisions.28 The provision originated in 
Section 304 of the Clean Air Act.29 After the enactment of Section 304 
of the CAA, Congress "lifted" this section into all new federal envi-
ronmental statutes or major amendments to those statutes.30 
A. Legislative History of the Citizen Suit Provision 
The 1970 amendments to the CAA included the new citizen suit 
provision in a congressional attempt to rectify the then prevailing in-
adequate methods of environmental enforcement.31 Given the in-
20 See id. 
21 See id. at 325. 
22 See Russell & Gregmy, supra note 17, at 325 n.83. 
23 See id. 325. 
2442 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994). 
25 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994). 
26 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994). 
2742 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). 
28 See Robert D. Snook, Environmental Citizen Suits and Judicial Interpretation: First Time 
Tragedy, Second TimeFarce, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 311, 313-14 (1998). Other lesser known 
environmental statutes also contain such a provision, including the Toxic Substances Con-
trol Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994), and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation 
Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994). 
29 See Snook, supra note 28, at314; seealsoCAA, § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d). 
30 See Snook, supra note 28, at 314. The result is that in some cases, citizens have the 
ability to enforce more provisions of acts than the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA). See Private Enforcement, supra note 13, at 10,310. For example, citizens have the abil-
ity to enforce more provisions of RCRA than EPA. See id. 
31 See Private Enforcement, supra note 13, at 10,309; see also CAA, § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7604(d) (1994). 
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creased interest in environmental protection when the amendment 
was enacted, opponents faced the political implications of opposing a 
"pro-environmental" legislation, which hindered their opposition to 
the legislation.32 The citizen suit provision of the CAA was sharply de-
bated, and tension ensued between Congress's intent to encourage 
citizen participation in environmental enforcement and Congress's 
simultaneous desire to prevent citizen interference with governmen-
tal enforcement.33 
Some legislators viewed citizen suits as an inexpensive alternative 
to government enforcement, and included the provision in an effort 
to encourage EPA to act when appropriate.34 Others wanted the pro-
vision to allow citizens to act as private attorneys general and enforce 
the laws directly.35 This approach assumed that citizens affected by 
pollution would be especially motivated and, therefore, uniquely ef-
fective advocates.36 Other proponents argued that citizen suits would 
curb the untrustworthiness or lack of will of federal environmental 
agencies, and also argued that the inevitable lack of sufficient re-
sources prevented these agencies from adequately addressing all 
statutory violations. 37 
Opponents of the provision feared that citizen suits would in-
crease the pressure upon already overburdened courts, and hinder 
the government's own regulatory actions.38 Others were concerned 
that because citizen suits were not controlled by a single national 
agency, they would result in inconsistent and haphazard application 
of environmentallaws.39 After considerable debate, Congress adopted 
the resulting citizen suit provision of the CAA, which granted citizens 
the ability to sue.40 
Still, requirements designed to encourage and provide for agency 
enforcement have restricted these suitS.41 First, before bringing suit, 
citizens have been required to notify the appropriate agencies, giving 
32 See Private Enforcement, supra note 13, at 10,310. 
33 See Snook, supra note 28, at 315. 
34 See id. at 316. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. 
37 See Conservation Law Found. v. Browner, 840 F. Supp. 171, 174 (D. Mass. 1993); Pti-
vate Enforcement, supra note 13, at 10,310. 
38 See Ptivate Enforcement, supra note 13, at 10,310; Snook, supra note 28, at 316. 
39 See Snook, supra note 28, at 316. 
4Q See Clean Air Act § 304(d) , 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d); Private Enforcement, supra note 13, at 
10,310. 
41 See Private Enforcement, supra note 13, at 10,310. 
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them the opportunity to bring suit in lieu of a citizen action.42 Addi-
tionally, citizens have not been allowed to sue for damages, only to 
redress statutory violations.43 Legitimate citizen suits have been en-
couraged by the attorneys' fees provision included in the statute, 
while at the same time frivolous suits have been discouraged by the 
fear of fees being awarded to prevailing defendants in those circum-
stances, thus easing the threat of an increased burden upon. the 
courtS.44 Following the 1970 amendments to the CAA, all new federal 
environmental statutes have included citizen suit provisions, and most 
existing statutes were amended to include such provisions, except the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).45 
B. The Importance of Citizen Suits in Environmental Enforcement 
Citizen suits are fundamental to the effective enforcement of en-
vironmentallegislation.46 These provisions are an integral part of vir-
tually every federal environmental statute.47 Citizen suits serve as the 
"essential backbone" of citizen participation in environmental deci-
sion-making by government, and provide for increased scrutiny of 
environmental law compliance by private industry.48 As the Third Cir-
cuit has noted: "Congress intended citizen suits to both goad the re-
sponsible agencies to more vigorous enforcement of the anti-
pollution standards and, if the agencies remained inert, to provide an 
alternative enforcement mechanism. "49 The legislative history of the 
CAA "suggests a sensitive handling of citizen suits, reflecting Con-
gress's conviction that such suits can perform an indispensable func-
tion."50 
In subsequent amendments to environmental legislation, Con-
gress has noted the value of citizen suits in environmental enforce-
ment.51 The Senate Report on the 1987 amendments to the CWA 
proclaimed citizen suits a "proven enforcement tool" that had "de-
42 See id. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. The attorneys' fees award provision is discussed in Section II, infra. 
45 See id. 
46 See Van Cleve, supra note 12, at 10,028. 
47 See id. This feature in American environmental law distinguishes it from the less suc-
cessful programs in other countries, which involve little to no citizen participation. See id. 
48 ld. 
49 Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979). 
50 Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159, 1168 (S.D.N.¥. 1980). 
51 See Amicus Brief at 17, Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 182 F.3d 1091 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (No. 98-15788) [hereinafter Murrelet Amicus Brief]. 
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terred violators and achieved significant compliance gains. "52 Senator 
Mitchell stated during debates surrounding the 1990 CAA amend-
ments that the use of court action via citizen suits was necessary, given 
the limited governmental resources to enforce legislation. 53 
Due to the nature of citizen suits and the structure of the citizen 
suit provisions in environmental legislation, citizens do not benefit 
financially from bringing suit. 54 Instead, relief is usually limited to ob-
taining an injunction, which prevents a defendant from performing 
harmful and/or illegal actions in the future. 55 This ensures that citi-
zens bring suit with altruistic, not financial, motivation.56 In perform-
ing this public service, a citizen can only be reimbursed for her costs 
and for attorneys' fees. 57 Even so, citizens, in particular non-profit 
citizen environmental organizations, have embraced the ability to en-
force environmental legislation via citizen suits. Furthermore, the 
probability ofrecovering attorneys' fees has increased the feasibility of 
these suits. 
II. ATTORNEYS' FEES PROVISIONS 
A. The American Rule 
The American Rule under the common law is that each party 
must bear its own expenses in litigation, including attorneys' fees. 58 
The American Rule differs substantially from the English Rule.59 Eng-
lish courts award litigation costs to the prevailing party, reasoning that 
absent another's wrongful conduct, the prevailing party would have 
had no reason to undergo litigation.60 
52 S. REp. No. 99-50, at 28 (1985). 
53 See 136 CONGo REc. S3180 (1990) ("Citizen resources are an important adjunct to 
governmental action to assure that these laws are adequately enforced. In a time of limited 
governmental resources, enforcement through court action prompted by citizen suits is a 
valuable dimension of environmental law. "). 
54 See Private Enforcement, supra note 13, at 1 0,31 O. 
55 See Murrelet Amicus Brief, supra note 51, at 30. 
56 See Friends of the Earth V. Chevron Chem. Co., 885 F. Stipp. 934, 939 (E.D. Tex. 
1995). 
57 See id. 
58 See AxLINE, supra note 3, at 8-2. 
59 See Lana Knedlik, Comment, Attorneys' Fees in Private Party Cost Recovery Actions Under 
CERCLA: The Key TronicDecision, 44 U. KAN. L. REv. 365, 370 (1996). 
60 See id. at 371. 
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Despite scholarly criticism, the Supreme Court has consistently 
reinforced the American Rule based on several rationales.61 First, the 
Court has argued that because the outcome of litigation is at best un-
certain, parties should not be penalized for merely defending or 
prosecuting a lawsuit.62 Additionally, the Court has held that individu-
als may be Ul~UStly discouraged from instituting action to vindicate 
their rights if the law allows for the award of attorneys' fees in all cir-
cumstances.63 The Court has also warned that the availability of attor-
neys' fees awards may also encourage attorneys to charge exorbitant 
fees. 64 Finally, the added administrative and financial expense in-
volved in determining the amount of attorneys' fees would excessively 
burden the judicial system.65 Congress and the courts have recognized 
that fee-shifting is appropriate in certain circumstances, and thus have 
created several exceptions to the American Rule, which soften the 
Rule's harsh effects.66 There are both judicial and statutory excep-
tions to the American Rule.67 
B. judicially-Created Exceptions to the American Rule 
The federal courts have developed three exceptions to the 
American Rule: the bad faith exception, the common fund exception, 
and the private attorneys general exception.68 The bad faith excep-
tion allows courts to award attorneys' fees to a successful litigant 
whose opponent acted "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for op-
pressive reasons. "69 This type of fee award acts as a punishment and 
also serves to deter malicious suits.70 The common fund exception 
61 See Kanad S. Virk, General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation Systems, Inc., 
Are Attorneys'fees Recoverable in CERCLA Private Cost Recovery Actions?, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1541, 
1544 (1991). 
62 See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); see 
al50 Virk, supra note 61, at 1544. 
63 See Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the American Rule 
in Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, indicating that in the United States, the prevailing 
litigant ordinarily is not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser. See 
421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). 
64 See Dean R. Nicyper, Note, Attorneys' Fees and Ruckel5haus v. Sierra Club: Discouraging 
Citizens from Challenging Administrative Agency Decisions, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 775, 784 (1984). 
65 SeeVirk, supra note 61, at 1544. 
66 See Nicyper, supra note 64, at 784. 
67 See id. at 785, 787; see al50 Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 247-49. 
68 See Knedlik, supra note 59, at 371; see al50 Richards M. Stephens, The Fees Stap Here: 
Statutory Purposes Limit Awards to Defendants, 36 DEPAUL L. REv. 489, 489-90 (1987); Nicy-
per, supra note 64, at 785. 
69 See Nicyper, supra note 64, at 785 & n.63. 
70 See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1,5 (1973). 
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permits courts to award attorneys' fees from a common fund to a liti-
gant who has conferred a benefit on other beneficiaries of the fund 
who were not litigants.7I This exception prevents the unjust enrich-
ment of non-litigant beneficiaries at a litigant's expense. 72 
The third judicially-created exception was the short-lived private 
attorneys general exception.73 This exception, created to encourage 
private enforcement of legislation, was ultimately rejected by the Su-
preme Court.74 In Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, the Court 
determined that the private attorneys general exception granted the 
courts too much discretion in making award determinations.75 The 
Court stated that fees could not be awarded absent a statute authoriz-
ing an award of attorneys' fees. 76 
C. Statutory Exceptions to the American Rule 
In addition to judicially-created exceptions, Congress can include 
attorneys' fees provisions in statutes, which authorize the award of 
attorneys' fees under certain circumstances.77 The standard for an 
award of attorneys' fees varies among individual statutes.7S The stan-
dards range from fee awards only for prevailing parties to the "appro-
priate standard," which gives the courts discretion to award fees 
whenever they determine it is "appropriate. "79 
In an effort to encourage citizen suits, Congress included provi-
sions for awards of attorneys' fees in virtually all authorizing legisla-
tion.so There are now more than 150 federal fee-shifting statutes.S1 By 
providing compensation for the expenses incurred in bringing suit, 
Congress has encouraged citizen enforcement of legislation.s2 With-
out the possibility of an award of attorneys' fees, statutes authorizing 
citizens to bring such suits would be essentially meaningless because 
71 See Knedlik, supra note 59, at 371; see also Stephens, supra note 68, at 489-90; Nicy-
per, supra note 64, at 785. 
72 See Nicyper, supra note 64, at 785-86. 
73 See Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 694 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (serving as private attorney 
general benefits others and entitles plaintiff to fees), a/I'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972); see also 
Newman v. Piggie Pal'k Enters., 390 U.S. 400 (1968). 
74 See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 240. 
75 See 421 U.S. at 264; see also Stephens, supra note 68, at 491-92. 
76 See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 264. 
77 See Nicyper, supra note 64, at 787. 
78 See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983). 
79 See id. 
80 See id.; AxLINE, supra note 3, at 8-2. 
81 See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 684. 
82 See AxLINE, supra note 3, at 8-2. 
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no one could afford the costs surrounding litigation.83 The inherent 
financial risk surrounding bringing suit would deter citizens from en-
forcing environmental legislation without the possibility that they 
would be awarded attorneys' fees.84 
1. The "Appropriate" Standard 
The fee-shifting standard in the CAA and the other subsequent 
environmental statutes is the "appropriate" standard.85 The "appro-
priate" standard of awarding attorneys' fees provides that fees may be 
awarded whenever the court determines they are appropriate.86 Un-
der the "appropriate" standard, prevailing or substantially prevailing 
plaintiffs are almost automatically awarded attorneys' fees. 87 The Su-
preme Court, in an action under a similar fee-shifting provision of 
Title II of the federal Civil Rights Act, stated that a prevailing plaintiff 
"should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circum-
stances would render such an award unjust. "88 In practice, there are 
virtually no cases in which a prevailing plaintiff has been denied at-
torneys' fees.89 Denying prevailing plaintiffs attorneys' fees defeats the 
legislative purpose of encouraging legitimate citizen suitS.90 
The "appropriate" standard differs from other fee-shifting provi-
sions because it gives the courts more discretion in fee awards.91 
Other fee-shifting standards had provided specific parameters for 
awards, such as "prevailing" or "substantially prevailing."92 Initially, 
courts had little guidance in determining what was appropriate and 
regularly held that success was not a prerequisite to an award of fees, 
but that fees would be awarded when the party promoted the goals of 
the statute.93 This led to unsuccessful plaintiffs obtaining awards of 
attorneys' fees under the premise that they nonetheless were promot-
ing the public interest.94 Courts also looked to the equitable princi-
83 See id. 
84 See id. 
85 Clean Air Act, § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1994). 
86 See id.; Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 309. 
87 See Nezuman, 390 U.S. at 402; MILLER, supra note 7, at 103. 
88 See Nezuman, 390 U.S. at 402. 
89 See MILLER, supra note 7, at 102 & n.45. 
90 See id at 102. 
91 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 307. 
92 See id. 
93 See id. 
94 See id. at 332; see also Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982); 
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 672 F.2d 42, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that it 
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pIes underlying the common law exceptions to the American Rule to 
attempt to award fees only when fair,95 
In Ruckelshaus v, Sierra Club, the Supreme Court brought the 
practice of awarding fees to unsuccessful plaintiffs to a halt,96 In Ruck-
elshaus, the Sierra Club filed a request for attorneys' fees, notwith-
standing their lack of success on the merits.97 Respondents founded 
their argument on Section 307 (f) of the CAA, which states that a 
court may award reasonable attorneys' fees "whenever [the court] de-
termines that such an award is appropriate."98 The Sierra Club argued 
that despite their failure to obtain the relief they desired, it was "ap-
propriate" for them to receive attorneys' fees for their contribution to 
the goals of the CAA.99 The D.C. Circuit agreed, awarding attorneys' 
fees to the Sierra Club of approximately $45,000 and to EDF, the co-
plaintiff, of approximately $46,000.100 The Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that even when a substantial benefit is conferred on the pub-
lic, the courts and EPA could not grant a party an award of attorneys' 
fees absent some success on the merits.101 The Court found the prac-
tice of awarding fees to unsuccessful plaintiffs inequitable, and held 
that these awards could no longer be made under the guise of the 
public interest.102 
The Supreme Court in Ruckelshaus utilized the legislative history 
of the CAA to determine whether parties other than those who prevail 
is "appropriate" to make awards of attorneys' fees without regard to the outcome of the 
litigation when it serves the public interest); Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 3 
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (holding that the dominant consideration is whether litiga-
tion by that party has served the public interest). 
95 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 332-33. 
96 See 463 U.S. at 682. This was a 5-4 decision in which Justice Rehnquist delivered the 
majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices v\'hite, Powell, and O'Connor. 
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and B1ack-
mun joined. 
97 See id. at 681. In the original suit, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and the 
Sierra Club challenged the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) promulgated stan-
dards limiting the emission of sulfur dioxide by coal-burning power plants. See id. EDF 
argued that the standards promulgated by the EPA were tainted by the agency's ex parte 
contacts with representatives of private industry, while the Sierra Club contended that EPA 
lacked authority under the CAA to issue the type of standards that it did. See id. The Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected all the claims made by EDF and the Sierra 
Club. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
98 See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 680-82; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (1994). 
99 See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682. 
100 See Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 684 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Ruckelshaus 
v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983). 
101 See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682. 
102 See id. at 686. 
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on the merits should receive attorneys' fees. 103 The Court concluded 
that one of the central concerns of Congress' when including the fee-
shifting provision in the CAA was to provide some check on the mul-
tiplicity of potentially meritless suits that Congress feared would fol-
low the addition of citizen suit provisions.104 Therefore, attorneys' fees 
awards to parties that do not succeed would be detrimental to that 
concern.105 
Justice Stevens's dissent in Ruckelshaus stated that Congress in-
tended to give the federal courts discretion in the awarding of attor-
neys' fees,I06 Justice Stevens also argued that Congress deliberately 
used language in Section 307 (f) of the CAA that differs from the pre-
viously used "prevailing party" standard, and that Congress therefore 
intended to give lower courts discretion to make awards to a broader 
category of parties.107 Justice Stevens further contended that if Con-
gress wanted attorneys' fees to be awarded only to prevailing parties, it 
would have stated that clearly instead of using language leaving dis-
cretion to the lower court.108 Thus, because of the legislative history 
and the language used by Congress, the dissenters believed the word-
ing of the statute was a deliberate attempt by Congress to broaden the 
scope of attorneys' fees awards.109 Justice Stevens's dissent concluded 
by asserting that the category of what is "appropriate" should be con-
strued narrowly, but that the Court cannot read this standard out of 
the statute altogether. no 
Mter the Ruckelshaus decision, it is not appropriate for a federal 
court to award attorneys' fees absent some degree of success on the 
merits by the claimant.111 This decision reaffirms the Supreme Court's 
commitment to the American Rule, as the Court determined that the 
practice of awarding fees to unsuccessful plaintiffs was a radical de-
parture from traditional fee-shifting principles and also unfair and 
inequitable.ll2 Although Ruckelshaus specifically applied to the CAA, 
103 See id. at 686-94; see also Nicyper, supra note 64, at 797. 
104 See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 692-93. 
105 See id. 
106 See id. at 694 (Stevens,]., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Brennan, 
Marshall, and Blackmun. See id. ' 
107 See id. at 694. 
106 See id. at 703-05. 
109 See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 704. 
110 See id at 712. 
m See id. 
112 Id. at 681-83; see also Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 344. 
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that reasoning has been applied to all statutes that use the "appropri-
ate" standard.113 
2. Determining Fee Awards 
Although only a prevailing or substantially prevailing party may 
be awarded attorneys' fees, the party need not achieve extensive or 
major success, but the success must still relate to the purposes of the 
statute involved.ll4 Congress departed from the "prevailing party" lan-
guage in order to expand the class of parties eligible for fee awards 
from prevailing parties to partially prevailing parties-parties achiev-
ing some success, even if they did not achieve m~or success. ll5 
The question of how much success on the merits is necessary for 
an award of attorneys' fees and whether the amount awarded should 
correlate with the amount of success is unresolved. ll6 Additionally, 
other than the fact that it is not appropriate to award fees to unsuc-
cessfullitigants, there is limited guidance from the Supreme Court to 
aid the determination of what is appropriate.1l7 One of the major 
drawbacks to the attorneys' fees provisions is the resulting time spent 
litigating over attorneys' fees for cases that have already been decided 
on the merits.llS Courts generally dislike the amount of time spent 
litigating non-substantive issues related to citizen suits.ll9 Nonetheless, 
courts are often forced to make determinations regarding attorneys' 
fees for both plaintiffs and defendants. 
With plaintiffs, time is spent litigating over the appropriateness of 
the award and the amount of the award.120 In Hensley v. Eckerhart, the 
Supreme Court discussed the relationship between the degree of suc-
cess and the amount of the award with regard to the fee-shifting pro-
vision of the Civil Rights Act.121 The Court indicated that lower courts 
should examine: (1) the "relatedness" of the claims in the case, and 
(2) the "level" of success.122 The Court has consistently interpreted 
the fee-shifting provisions of the Civil Rights Act and of environ-
113 See463 u.s. at 682 n.1. 
114 See id. at 688. 
115 See id. 
116 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 311. 
117 See Ruckleshaus, 463 U.S. at 683; Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 311. 
liS See AxLINE, supra note 3, at 8-3. 
119 See id. 
120 See id. 
121 See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 (1983). 
122 Id. at 434. 
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mental statutes similarly-thus, it is likely courts will apply the Hensley 
analysis to determine what is the "appropriate" award in environ-
. mental cases.123 
Parties also spend court time litigating over fees for defen-
dants.124 Defendants try to obtain attorneys' fees under two circum-
stances.125 First, when they believe the suit was frivolous or harass-
ing.126 Second, defendants try to obtain fees as the prevailing party.l27 
Courts are forced to make determinations regarding whether suits are 
frivolous, harassing, or without foundation.l28 The Court in Christians-
burg Garment Co. v. EEOC warned district courts that when making 
these assessments they must 
resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc 
reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ul-
timately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or 
without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could dis-
courage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a 
prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success.l29 
Although much of the debate in the higher courts has focused on 
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, prevailing defendants have been fighting for 
plaintiffs to pay their attorneys' fees when they are the prevailing par-
ties.130 Thus far, defendants have only been awarded attorneys' fees in 
limited circumstances.131 
D. The Nature of Citizen Suits Necessitates Awards of Attorneys' Fees 
Citizens who bring suit to enforce environmental statutes nor-
mally do so on behalf of the community, and not typically for personal 
gain.l32 Because of this, there are few incentives for citizens to bring 
suit, and many disincentives.l33 The possibility of the award of attor-
neys' fees if successful is only a limited incentive for attorneys to rep-
123 See AxLINE, supra note 3, at 8-8. 
124 See id. at 14. 
125 See id. 
126 See id. 
127 See id. 
128 See AxLINE, supra note 3, at 14. 
129 434 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1978). 
130 See, e.g., Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 3. 
131 See E. RICHARD LARSON, FEDERAL COURT AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS' FEES 85-97 
(1981). 
132 See AxLINE, supra note 3, at 8-1. 
\33 See id. 
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resent citizen groups.134 If a group does not prevail, the attorney is 
likely not to receive compensation.135 Additionally, if that citizen 
plaintiff is only partially successful, the fee award is likely to be re-
duced. Even if the citizen group is the prevailing party, there is likely 
to be a dispute over fees, which may result in a second round of major 
litigation. Therefore, it may be several years before the attorney re-
ceives compensation, and even then, the attorney is not usually com-
pensated adequately for the actual amount of effort put into the 
suit. 136 
Due to the substantial risk involved with environmental litigation, 
attorneys' fees provisions are necessary for such suits to be effective.137 
The complex and technical nature of environmental litigation, cou-
pled with complications of proof, together lead to enormous ex-
penses.138 Citizen plaintiffs often face defendants, such as the gov-
ernment and private industry, with vast resources to defend their 
cases.139 Without attorneys' fees provisions, citizens often would not 
have the resources to finance a suit because the contingency fee sys-
tem usually employed in litigation with under-funded clients is un-
available as these suits can seek only injunctive, not monetary relief.l40 
Citizens usually do not have the personal resources to contribute to 
the regulation of the environment, nor sufficient personal stake in the 
suit to contribute the amount necessary to prosecute usually well-
funded defendants. HI 
In the first major case awarding attorneys' fees under the "ap-
propriate" standard, the First Circuit stated that "the lack of measur-
able interest on the part of any individual member of the public, and 
the difficulties inherent in complex litigation in a rapidly developing 
field of law, make the economics of citizen suits a serious problem. "142 
Additionally, environmental public interest groups are commonly 
non-profit groups with unreliable sources of funding, such as mem-
bership dues and donations.I43 Courts have recognized the need for 
attorneys' fees provisions for effective enforcement-without them, 
134 See id. at 8--2. 
135 See id. at 8--3. 
136 See id. at 8--2-8--3. 
137 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 326--27. 
138 See id. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. at 327. 
141 See id. 
142 Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1334 (1st Cir. 1973). 
143 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 327. 
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the citizen suit provisions of these statutes would be largely ineffec-
tive. 
III. AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR PREVAILING DEFENDANTS 
There is a dual standard in the awarding of attorneys' fees. l44 
This dual standard generally holds prevailing defendants to a stricter 
standard in determining whether an award is "appropriate. "145 Courts 
follow the standard set by the Supreme Court in Christiansburg Gar-
ment Co. v. EEOC,146 a Civil Rights Act case. Courts follow this civil 
rights case as precedent for environmental cases because the fee shift-
ing provisions and the legislative intent of environmental legislation 
are similar to civil rights legislation.147 The Christiansburg standard 
states that a prevailing defendant may recover fees only if it can show 
that a "plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foun-
dation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith. "148 
The Court in Christiansburg stated two "strong [and] equitable" 
considerations for awarding plaintiffs attorneys' fees, while greatly 
restricting defendants' ability to obtain attorneys' fees under the Civil 
Rights Act.149 First, under Title II of the Civil Rights Act, citizen plain-
tiffs are Congress's chosen instrument to vindicate "a policy that Con-
gress considered of the highest priority. "150 Second, when attorneys' 
fees are awarded to the prevailing plaintiff, the party bearing the costs 
is the party that violated the law.151 The Court concluded that these 
factors are absent when considering a fee award to a prevailing de-
fendan t. 152 
In Christiansburg, the prevailing defendant, Christiansburg Gar-
ment Company, petitioned for attorneys' fees against the EEOC pur-
suant to Section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act's Title VII.153 The dis-
144 See David Berger, Court Awards of Attorneys 'fees: Litigating Antitrust, Civil Rights, Public 
Interest and Securities Cases-Prevailing Party Concepts in Court Awards of AttIJrneys' Fees, 324 
PLI/Lit. 41, 77 (1987). 
145 See AxUNE, supra note 3, at 8-14; Miller, supra note 7, at 108; Berger, supra note 144, 
at 77. 
146 434 U.S. 412 (1978). 
147 See AxUNE, supra note 3, at 8-14 n.64. 
148 See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 418. 
149 See id. 
150 Id.; see Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). 
151 See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 418. 
152 Seeid. at 418-19. 
153 See id. at 415. Section 706(k) states that "[iJn any action or proceeding under this 
title the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable aumney's 
fee .... " § 706(k), 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(k) (1994). 
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trict court found that the Commission's action in bringing suit was 
not unreasonable or meritless; therefore, an award of attorneys' fees 
to the defendant was unjustified.154 A divided Fourth Circuit affirmed 
the decision.155 The Supreme Court discussed the legislative history of 
Section 706(k) of Title VII in determining that defendants can obtain 
attorneys' fees only when the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or 
without foundation. l56 The Court cited directly to the legislative his-
tory of Section 706(k), which states that the fee provision was in-
cluded in the statute to "make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means 
to bring a meritorious suit. "157 Furthermore, the Court observed that 
in the history of Title II's fee-shifting provision, an almost identical 
attorney fee provision to Title VII, members of the Senate explained 
that its allowance of awards to defendants in limited circumstances 
would serve "to deter the bringing oflawsuits without foundation," "to 
discourage frivolous suits," and "to diminish the likelihood of un-
justified suits being brought. "158 The Court stated that Congress 
wanted not only to make it easier for plaintiffs to bring suit, but also 
to protect defendants from burdensome litigation having no legal or 
factual basis.159 
Another policy consideration supporting the dual standard is 
that attorneys' fees awards to prevailing plaintiffs are made against the 
defendant, a violator of the federallaw,160 Not only does this further 
the notion that awards to plaintiffs are equitable, it also appears to 
show that awards have another purpose-to serve as a punishment 
against those who violate the law.161 Awarding fees partially to punish 
does not apply to plaintiffs as they should not be punished for bring-
ing a legitimate lawsuit,162 However, it is clear that plaintiffs should be 
"punished" for bringing a frivolous or harassing suit by being re-
quired to pay the prevailing defendants' attorneys' fees in those cir-
cumstances.163 
154 See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 415. 
155 See id. at 415. 
156 See id. at 420-21. 
157 [d. at 420 (1978). 
158 [d. 
159 See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 420. 
160 See id. at 418. 
161 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 358. 
162 See id. 
163 See id. 
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Thus, fee awards to plaintiffs and defendants differ substantially 
in nature and serve different purposes.l64 A fee award to plaintiffs 
serves to encourage legitimate citizen suits by allowing citizens and 
attorneys to bring suit with the prospect of receiving attorneys' fees 
from the losing defendant, while at the same time serving as a pun-
ishment for environmental law violations. I6s A fee award to defen-
dants serves to discourage illegitimate or meritless suits brought by 
citizen organizations or private citizens solely to harass or embarrass 
the defendant. I66 Additionally, a fee award to defendants serves as a 
punishment against the citizen plaintiffs that bring meritless suits for 
illegitimate purposes.I67 Although fee awards to both plaintiffs and 
defendants have legitimate purposes, their purposes are often quite 
different and apply only when certain criteria are met.l68 
A. Legislative Intent to Limit Awards of Attorneys' Fees to Defendants Under 
Environmental Statutes 
The Christiansburg decision created the dual standard in the 
awarding of attorneys' fees.I69 This dual standard created by Chris-
tiansburg resulted from a deliberate collusion between Congress and 
the Supreme Court in an effort to enable plaintiffs with little or no 
capital to bring suit, while simultaneously attempting to deter 
meritless suitS.I70 When drafting the language of the attorneys' fees 
provision of the CAA, the Act's authors in the Senate were cognizant 
that their wording left the door open for defendants to recover attor-
neys' fees.I71 This was a deliberate attempt to encourage legitimate 
citizen suits and discourage illegitimate suits.172 The resulting lan-
guage was the very essence of the legislative compromise between 
proponents of the citizen suit provision and opponents who feared it 
would flood the federal courts with litigation.173 Opponents of the 
citizen suit provision of the CAA feared it would encourage frivolous 
and harassing suits. This fear prompted the Senate to add the possibil-
164 See Christiansburg, 434 u.s. at 418-419. 
165 See AxLINE, supra note 3, at 8-8; Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 329. 
166 See Nicyper, supra note 64, at 798. 
167 See Stephens, supra note 68, at 514-17. 
168 See generally Nicyper, supra note 64. 
169 See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 418-19. 
170 See Berger, supra note 144, at 77-78. 
171 See MILLER, supra note 7, at 98. 
172 See id. 
173 See id. at 108. 
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ity of the award of attorneys' fees to defendants in such circum-
stances.I74 Initially, the language of the legislation used the phrase "in 
the public interest" as opposed to "when appropriate," to state when 
fees would be awarded. I75 The phrase "in the public interest" was seen 
as not only encouraging legitimate suits with the possibility of an 
award of attorneys' fees, but also awarding fees to defendants when it 
was in the public interest, such as discouraging harassing suitS.I76 
In floor debate, Senator Hruska, a vocal critic of the citizen suit 
provision, contended that a citizen suit provision would "result in a 
multiplicity of suits which [would] interfere with the Executive's ca-
pability of carrying out his or her duties and responsibilities. "177 In 
rebuttal, Senators Muskie and Hart, key sponsors of the legislation, 
argued that the possibility of awarding attorneys' fees to defendants 
would discourage harassing and frivolous suits.178 They reasoned that 
the threat of bearing the costs of the parties against whom the citizens 
brought the suit, along with their own litigation costs, would deter any 
frivolous or harassing suits.I79 In sum, the available legislative history 
suggests that Congress intended that the fee-shifting provision of the 
CAA allow for defendants to recover attorneys' fees when appropriate, 
implying that it is only appropriate when the action is frivolous or 
harassing. ISO 
174 SeeS. REp. No. 91-1196, at 36-39 (1970); LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR 
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970 436-39 (1972) (hereinafter CAA70 LEG. HIST.). The Senate 
report stated: 
Concern was expressed that some lawyers would use Section 304 to bring 
frivolous and harassing actions. The Committee has added a key element in 
providing that the courts may award costs of litigation, including reasonable 
attorney and expert witness fees, whenever the court determines that such ac-
tion is in the public interest. The court could thus award costs of litigation to 
defendants where the litigation was obviously frivolous or harassing. This 
should have the effect of discouraging abuse of this provision, while at the 
same time encouraging the quality of the actions that will be brought. 
S. REP. No. 91-1196, at 36-39. 
175 See MILLER, supra note 7, at 9S. As one can see from the above quote, this change 
was not mentioned in the conference report, and the analysis continued to explain the 
standard as "in the public interest." [d. at 99. 
176 See S. REp. No. 91-1196, at 36-39 (1970); CAA70 LEG. HIST., supra note 174, at 
436-39. 
177 [d. 
178 See id. 
179 SeeCAA70 LEG. HI ST., supra note 174, at 2S0-S1 (Statement of Sen. Muskie). 
180 See MILLER, supra note 7, at lOS. 
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B. Judicial Interpretation 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the legislative intent of fee-
shifting provisions as disallowing defendants' recovery of attorneys' 
fees absent a frivolous or harassing suit.181 The reasoning behind de-
nying defendants attorneys' fees lies in the burden that the award 
would place on plaintiffs. The risk of bearing this burden, it is argued, 
would substantially undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the 
citizen enforcement of federal legislation.182 Courts recognize the 
risks involved with citizen plaintiffs bringing suit and recognize that 
citizen plaintiffs often face defendants with more resources.183 Courts 
also recognize that Congress tried to even the balance by providing 
incentives for bringing meritorious lawsuits by treating successful 
plaintiffs more favorably than successful defendants in terms of the 
award of attorneys' fees. 184 
Although the Supreme Court has not applied this standard to 
defendants outside of civil rights litigation, given the similarity be-
tween the fee-shifting provisions of each piece of legislation, it ap-
pears the Court would apply the Christiansburg standard to environ-
mental fee-shifting provisions as well.185 When defendants have been 
awarded attorneys' fees for defending against frivolous, harassing, or 
foundationless suits, courts have occasionally considered other fac-
tors, such as the plaintiffs' inability to payor status as a non-profit or-
ganization, in reducing or eliminating the award to defendants.186 In 
these circumstances, even if the case was determined to be frivolous, 
harassing, or without merit, courts have found it inequitable to award 
attorneys' fees due to the circumstances,187 
In Christiansburg, the Supreme Court made a distinction between 
allowing fee awards to defendants when the suit was frivolous, harass-
ing or meritless and allowing fee awards for merely defending a le-
181 See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 523 (1994); Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422. 
182 See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422. 
183 See Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 523. 
184 See id. 
185 See AxLINE, supra note 3, at 8-14 n.64. 
186 See Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing the Problem, 
1986 DUKE LJ. 435, 449; see also Faraci v. Hickey-Freeman Co., 607 F.2d 1025, 1028-29 (2d 
Cir. 1979) (awarding $200 attorneys' fee to defendant due to defendant's financial dis-
tress); Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Center, Inc., 709 F.2d 807, 814 (2d. Cir. 1983) 
(awarding defendant fees because it was "a non-profit association comprised primarily of 
members who earn their living with their hands"). 
187 See AxLINE, supra note 3, at 8-14 n.64. 
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gitimate suit. ISS It is seen as equitable for defendants to receive com-
pensation in the form of attorneys' fees when they have been forced 
to defend a lawsuit brought solely to harass and embarrass.1S9 How-
ever, it is seen as inequitable to compensate defendants for merely 
defending a legitimate lawsuit, while simultaneously punishing the 
citizen plaintiffs who brought a legitimate suit and simply IOSt.190 
C. Defendants' Arguments for Attorneys' fees 
Defendants continue to question the Christiansburg standard 
which so limits their ability to obtain attorney fee awards. 191 In Citizens 
for a Better Environment v. The Steel C01npanyl92-a case now on remand 
from the Supreme Court regarding the defendant's request for attor-
neys' fees-the defendant's request for attorneys' fees was ultimately 
denied on jurisdictional grounds, but the defendant's arguments on 
the merits of the claim offer insight into a typical defendant's reason-
ing.193 Defendants argued in Steel Co. that Congress intended to pro-
vide a fee-shifting mechanism to soften the burden any prevailing 
party would bear in litigating its case, including defendants.l94 The 
Steel Company also asserted two main arguments in support of the 
motion for attorneys' fees,195 First, The Steel Company argued that 
188 SeegmeraUy Christiansburg v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). 
189 See id. 
190 See id. 
191 See gmeraUy Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5. 
192 See id. The original case was decided by the Supreme Court on March 4, 1998, 
which held that the Court lacked subject matter judsdiction, and thus dismissed the case. 
See Citizens for a Better Environment v. The Steel Co., 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1009-1021 (1998). 
The Supreme Court held that the citizens "lack[ed] standing to maintain [the] suit and we 
and the lower courts lackjurisdktion to entertain it." [d. at 1021. Thus, although the plain-
tiffs won in the Seventh Circuit, the defendants were ultimately the prevailing party, but on 
jurisdictional grounds, not on the merits. See id. The defendants violated the federal 
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) for seven years. See id. 
at 1009. However, because The Steel Company was in compliance with EPCRA at the time 
the suit was filed, the Court determined that CBE lacked standing to bring suit. See id. 
193 See Citizens for a Better Env't v. The Steel Co., 1999 \VL 412439 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
The district court utilized the Supreme Court's language from their decision in this case 
on the merits: "[a]n interest in attorneys' fees is ... insufficient to create an Article III case 
or controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim." 118 S.Ct. 1003, 
1019 (1998). In the original case, the Supreme Court determined that no Article III case 
or controversy existed because there was no longer an EPCRA violation-thus, there would 
not be an Article III case or controversy to establish jurisdiction to determine attorneys' 
fees. See Steel Co., 1999 WL 412439 at *2. The decision did not discuss The Steel Co.'s ar-
guments on the merits. See id. 
194 See Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 2. 
195 See gmerally Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5. 
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their efforts in litigating the case served the public interest by assisting 
the interpretation and implementation of the Emergency Planning 
and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA), and their efforts ought 
to be a factor in determining an attorney fee award.196 Second, they 
contended that the Christiansburg standard for awards of attorneys' 
fees does not apply to cases filed under EPCRA.197 
The Steel Company's first argument suggested that Congress in-
tended EPCRA's Section 326(f) fee authorization not only to encour-
age the participation of citizen plaintiffs, but also to encourage de-
fendant's participation in resolving important and difficult questions 
of constitutional and statutory interpretation and in implementing 
the statute.198 By awarding fees to defendants as well, the Steel Com-
pany proposed, courts could ensure a vigorous defense and a bal-
anced presentation of views.199 In short, this argument posited that 
the possibility of attorneys' fees would encourage defendants to de-
fend their case more vigorously. 200 
The Steel Company further suggested that Congress intended 
the determination of whether or not a fee award is "appropriate" to 
be at the discretion of the courts and limited only in that the party 
must prevai1.201 Although the standard for awards of attorneys' fees 
under EPCRA is the "appropriate" standard, it provides no explicit 
factors or guidelines for the courts.202 Thus, The Steel Company con-
tended that Congress intended to allow prevailing defendants to re-
ceive attorneys' fees in circumstances beyond frivolous suits because it 
did not explicitly limit fee awards solely to parties defending a frivo-
lous action.203 
196 See id. at 5-7. The Ninth Circuit case of Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Secre-
tary of Interior, 748 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1984), which awarded attorneys' fees to prevailing 
defendants whenever the defendant's actions "substantially contributed" to the goals of the 
ESA, was recently held to no longer be good law by the Ninth Circuit based upon the Su-
preme Court's ruling in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council. See 478 U.S. 546, 
558-560 (1986); Marbled Murrlet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 182 F.3d 1091, 1094-1095 (9th 
Cir. 1999). Delaware Valley held that attorneys' fees provisions in environmental statutes 
with similar language and purpose as the attorneys' fees provision in the Civil Rights Acts 
should be interpreted in the same way. See 478 U.S. at 558-60. That case also clarified that 
the Christiansburg standard under the Civil Rights Act also applied to citizen suits arising 
under environmental legislation. See id. 
197 See Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 7-12. 
198 See id. at 3. 
199 See id. 
200 See id. 
201 See id. at 5. 
202 See Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 5. 
203 See id. 
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The defendants additionally argued in Steel Co. that several courts 
have reasoned that the dominant consideration in determining 
whether a fee award is "appropriate" should be whether the party's 
efforts have "served the public interest by assisting the interpretation 
and implementation of the statute. "204 The Steel Company urged that 
in determining whether an award is appropriate, courts should con-
sider: (1) whether the party assisted the judicial interpretation of the 
statute; (2) whether the issues involved were novel and important; 
and, (3) whether the case furthered understanding of the statute.205 
Because their efforts in defending the suit had provided a benefit to 
the public and the judiciary by aiding in the correct interpretation of 
EPCRA, defendants believed they were entitled to attorneys' fees. 206 
The second argument was that the Christiansburg standard does 
not apply to EPCRA.207 The defendants argued that the language of 
the statute does not endorse the dual standard of treating prevailing 
plaintiffs and defendants differently.208 Congress made no distinction 
between parties and instead left it to the courts' discretion to deter-
mine when it would be appropriate to award attorneys' fees to a pre-
vailing party.209 The Steel Company asserted that when Congress has 
intended to set forth a dual standard such as the one articulated in 
Christiansburg, it has done so explicitly in the language of the statute, 
such as in the Administrative Procedure Act and certain antitrust leg-
islation.21o The EPCRA provision for attorneys' fees states that the 
court may award fees "to the prevailing or substantially prevailing 
party whenever [it] determines such an award is appropriate."211 This 
standard does not compel the application of the Christiansburg stan-
dard, but instead, defendants argued, indicates Congress's preference 
for an evenhanded approach, which would treat prevailing plaintiffs 
and defendants equally.212 
The defendants' argument also suggested that EPCRA's fee-
shifting provision should be seen as nearly identical to that found in 
the Copyright Act.213 The Supreme Court had held in Fogerty v. Fan-
204 See id. at 6; see also supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
205 See Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 4. 
206 See id; see also supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
207 See Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 7-12. 
208 See id. 
209 See id. at 8. 
210 See id. at 9-10. 
211 Id. 
212 See Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 9-10. 
213 See id. 
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tasy, Inc.214 that prevailing plaintiffs and defendants must be treated 
alike under the fee-shifting provision of the Copyright Act.215 The 
Steel Company argued that since the language of the two statutes is 
similar, and neither statute's legislative history suggests that prevailing 
plaintiffs and defendants should be treated differently, the two stat-
utes should be interpreted similarly.216 
Additionally, The Steel Company drew a distinction between the 
policy considerations at work in Christiansburg under the Civil Rights 
Act and in environmental citizen litigation.217 The defendants' brief 
observed that the Supreme Court had stated in Christiansburg that 
"impecunious 'private attorney general' plaintiffs can ill afford to liti-
gate their claims against defendants with more resources. "218 The de-
fendants then claimed that the Court had tried to provide an incen-
tive to plaintiffs for bringing meritorious lawsuits, by treating 
successful plaintiffs more favorably than successful defendants due to 
the great risk citizen plaintiffs encounter when bringing civil rights 
suitS.219 The defendants claimed that the citizens in environmental 
citizen suits differ from those in civil rights suits as they are not indi-
viduals aiming to vindicate their rights.22o In environmental citizen 
litigation, noted the defendants, the plaintiffs usually tend to be large, 
well-funded organizations devoted to bringing environmental law-
suits.221 Defendants stated that this makes the typical environmental 
plaintiff more akin to the so-called behemoth referred to by the Su-
preme Court in Fogerty, the copyright case, than the impecunious 
plaintiffs in civil rights cases.222 
The Steel Company further suggested that environmental plain-
tiffs differ from civil rights plaintiffs in that these citizen suits are not 
Congress's preferred method of enforcement.223 Although Congress 
had provided for citizens to be influential in environmental enforce-
ment, the defendants argued that they were meant merely to supple-
214 510 U.S. 517 (1994). 
215 Compare Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 420-423, with Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 10-
12 (comparison showing the policy considerations at work in a civil rights case, and what 
defendants suggest is the policy consideration behind environmental citizen suits). 
216 See Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 10. 
217 See id. 
218 See id. 
219 See id. 
220 See id. 
221 See Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 11. For example, CBE, who brought suit against 
The Steel Co., has over 30,000 members and 180,000 contributors. See id. 
222 See id. 
223 See id. 
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ment the efforts of the government in the area of environmental en-
forcement, whereas, in the civil rights cases, citizens are Congress's 
"chosen instrument. "224 The arguments put forth by The Steel Com-
pany were similar to the arguments made by the defendant in Marbled 
Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber CO.225 In Marbled Murrelet, the Ninth Circuit 
relied on the reasoning in Christiansburg when holding that the de-
fendants were not entitled to attorneys' fees because the suit was not 
frivolous, harassing or unreasonable. 226 
IV. THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN FEE AWARDS 
Both the legislative history and the case law surrounding attor-
neys' fees awards state that defendants can only obtain attorneys' fees 
in very limited circumstances.227 The environmental statutes them-
selves state that fees can be awarded to any party when the court de-
termines an award is "appropriate."228 This language, however, is 
somewhat misleading as awards are certainly more limited than the 
statute on its face seems to indicate.229 Congress appears to have in-
tended to grant the courts discretion in determining when an award 
is appropriate and what the extent of that award should be.230 The 
legislative history further shows that the intent was not to give the 
courts the discretion to award fees to prevailing defendants in all cir-
cumstances.231 
The courts have interpreted the legislative history and clarified 
the meaning of "appropriate" in the context of attorneys' fees provi-
sions.232 First, the Ruckelshaus decision eliminated awards to unsuc-
cessful plaintiffs, and later the Christiansburg decision restricted 
awards to defendants to limited circumstances.233 Aside from these 
limitations, courts have the ability to award fees at their discretion, 
i.e., when "appropriate."234 
224 See id. 
225 See Murrelet Amicus Brief, supra note 51; see also Marbled Murrelet, 182 F.3d at 1096. 
226 Marbled Murrelet, 182 F.3d at 1096. 
227 See supra notes 110-28 and accompanying text. 
228 See id. 
229 See id. 
230 See id. 
231 See generally S. REp. No. 91-1196 (1970). 
232 See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 686--94 (1983); ChristiansbUl"g v. 
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418-23 (1978). 
233 See id; see also supra notes 84-101 and accompanying text. 
234 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 355-56. 
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Given the unique nature of citizen suits, it is only "appropriate" 
to award fees when it is equitable to do so. Mter Ruckelshaus, citizens 
face the risk of paying their own attorneys' fees if they do not pre-
vail.235 The added risk of paying a defendant's attorneys' fees could 
deter even the most enthusiastic citizens from bringing suit because 
the financial risk would be too great.236 The court in Friends of the 
Earth v. Chevron Chemical Company stated that "[t]o place upon these 
citizen plaintiffs the speculative hazard of paying defendant's attor-
neys' fees and costs would likely have an undesirable effect. Such a 
hazard would have a chilling effect upon citizens bringing enforce-
ment action .... "237 
A. Legislative Purpose of Attorneys' fees Provisions 
The statutory language of the typical environmental statute could 
lead one to conclude that both plaintiffs and defendants can obtain 
attorneys' fees when appropriate.238 The statutes were not, however, 
designed to give equal treatment to litigants because, absent statutes 
to the contrary, parties are generally equal under the American Rule 
and each side pays their own costS.239 With further investigation into 
the legislative history and the intent behind such provisions, it ap-
pears that Congress did not intend for defendants to receive attor-
neys' fees for merely prevailing in a lawsuit.240 There is no indication 
that Congress or the courts desired to stray from the current Ameri-
can Rule.241 Although the statutory award of attorneys' fees is permit-
ted, these statutes cannot completely override the purpose of the 
American Rule itself.242 
Careful study indicates that Congress had three goals in view 
when creating the attorney fee provisions of environmental citizen 
suits.243 First, Congress intended to increase the feasibility of citizen 
suits by decreasing the burden citizens themselves would bear.244 Sec-
ond, the specific language of the typical attorneys' fees provision was 
235 See generally Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983). 
236 See Murrelet Amicus Brief, supra note 51, at 32. 
237 885 F. Supp. 934, 939 (E.D. Tex.) (1995). 
238 See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Realty Inv. Ass'n, L.P., 524 F. Supp. 150, 
152 (1981). 
239 See Stephens, supra note 68, at 497. 
240 See supra notes 110-20 and accompanying text. 
241 See id. 
242 See supra notes 51-87 and accompanying text. 
243 See supra notes 33-47 and accompanying text; Nicyper, supra note 64, at 791-92. 
244 See AxLINE, supra note 3, at 8-2. 
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intended to increase judicial discretion in the award of attorneys' 
fees. 245 The purpose of the language "when appropriate" was to give 
the courts more discretion in their awarding of fees, allowing them 
the ability to award fees not only to prevailing parties, but also to par-
ties that only partially prevail. 246 Finally, Congress intended to limit or 
prevent frivolous suits from burdening the courts as a result of the 
citizen suit provisions.247 This was done by allowing defendants to ob-
tain attorneys' fees when the suit was determined to be frivolous or 
harassing.248 
1. Increasing the Feasibility of Citizen Suits 
Allowing the routine award of attorneys' fees to prevailing defen-
dants would have a chilling effect on citizen enforcement of environ-
mental legislation. In order to ensure the effectiveness of citizen suit 
provisions, Congress provided fee-shifting provisions in environ-
mental legislation to encourage citizens to engage in socially 
beneficial litigation.249 Common sense suggests that increasing defen-
dants' ability to recover attorneys' fees would significantly decrease 
the ability of citizens to bring suit.250 
The suggestion that the dual purpose of attorneys' fees provisions 
is to encourage defendants to aid in resolving difficult questions of 
constitutional and statutory interpretation must be seen as a 
stretch.251 Coupled with the above notion, defendants have proposed 
that without the possibility of attorneys' fees, the costs of litigating en-
vironmental citizen suits would hinder defendants' ability to put forth 
a vigorous defense to guarantee the courts that both sides will be ad-
vocated.252 However, common sense indicates that the possibility of 
attorneys' fees would not propel defendants to strongly advocate their 
case-the possibility of losing the suit and paying both damages and 
the plaintiff's attorneys' fees is usually more than enough of an en-
couragement to ensure a balanced presentation of views. Defending 
an environmental citizen suit is a great expense, but to suggest that 
245 See supra notes 96--100 and accompanying text; Nicyper, supra note 64, at 791. 
246 See Ruckelshaus, 463 u.s. at 704 & n.14. 
247 See supra notes 106--19 and accompanying text. 
248 See id. 
249 See supra notes 79-100 and accompanying text. 
250 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 326--27 & n.9l. 
251 See Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 3. 
252 See id. 
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without the prospect of attorneys' fees this expense would hinder the 
case put forth by defendants is almost certainly an overstatement. 
Although the defendants' efforts in the Steel Co. case in the end 
served to aid in the interpretation of EPCRA and thus served the pub-
lic interest, there is nothing in that statute's legislative history to sug-
gest that attorneys' fees should be awarded to defendants in such cir-
cumstances.253 The underlying purpose of the fee-shifting provisions 
and the legislative history clarify why defendants should not be able to 
recover attorneys' fees even when they serve the public interest.254 In 
creating attorney's fee provisions, Congress was concerned that indi-
viduals interested in protecting their environment would be forced to 
forego enforcement of environmental laws because of the lack of a 
financial stake in the outcome and a lack of resources with which to 
bring the suit. 255 
The risk of losing the suit would deter these individuals from 
filing a cause of action when, even if successful, they would gain little 
personally.256 Thus, fee-shifting provisions were designed to take the 
sting out of litigation in order to encourage private citizens to enforce 
laws for the greater good of the general public. 257 The fee-shifting 
provisions provide for the award of fees to plaintiffs in order to en-
courage litigation-routine awards of attorneys' fees to defendants 
would frustrate that purpose.258 Citizens considering bringing suit 
would have to consider not only the potential of their loss and paying 
their own costs, but the possibility of paying their opponents' fees as 
well.259 This would deter citizen suits and be directly contrary to the 
legislative intent behind the attorneys' fees provisions.26o 
Additionally, one must consider the fundamental difference be-
tween plaintiffs and defendants in citizen suits.261 Defendants in their 
primary argument for attorneys' fees have stated that the dominant 
consideration in the awarding of attorneys' fees should be whether 
the party's efforts have served the public interest by assisting the in-
terpretation and implementation of a statute, irrespective of what side 
253 See supra notes 156-67 and accompanying text. 
254 See supra notes 139-68 and accompanying text. 
255 See supra notes 157-68 and accompanying text. 
256 See Stephens, supra note 68, at 497. 
257 See id. 
258 See id. 
259 See id. 
260 See supra notes 68-94 and accompanying text. 
261 See supra notes 130-38, 142-56 and accompanying text. 
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of the case the party was on.262 This has neglected the reality that de-
fendants are usually litigating to avoid liability rather than for an al-
truistic concern for the public benefit regarding the correct interpre-
tation of a statute or the enforcement or non-enforcement of a 
particular law.263 Benefiting the public may ultimately result from the 
litigation, but this is not usually the driving force behind a successful 
defense. 
On the contrary, a citizen plaintiff has no reason to bring suit 
other than for the benefit of the public-there is no personal 
financial reward at stake for citizens. Defendants should not be "re-
warded" for successfully defending a suit with the payment of attor-
neys' fees by the plaintiffs. In such a case, plaintiffs who brought a le-
gitimate suit against a defendant would be responsible for their fees 
merely for losing the case. This certainly would deter citizen suits, if 
not make them non-existent, and is contrary to the underlying pur-
pose of the citizen suit provisions. 
It is, however, legitimate that plaintiffs would be responsible for 
the attorneys' fees of defendants if the court determined the suit was 
frivolous, harassing, or unreasonable, even if it was not brought in bad 
faith. 264 This is so because a defendant should not be responsible for 
defending against an illegitimate suit brought by a plaintiff.265 Award-
ing fees for defending a frivolous suit and awarding fees for merely 
defending a legitimate suit are quite different, and the Supreme 
Court clearly made this distinction in Christiansburg. 266 
2. Judicial Discretion in Awarding Attorney Fees 
Congress gave judges the discretion to award attorneys' fees when 
"appropriate. "267 Although guided by Ruckelshaus and Christiansburg, 
courts are otherwise given considerable leeway under the "appropri-
ate" standard for the exercise of discretion in awarding fees. 268 The 
Ruckelshaus decision sets the minimum requirement of some level of 
success, or "nontrivial" success, but a litigant who satisfies that re-
262 SeeSteeI Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 6. 
263 See Stephens, supra note 68, at 493. 
264 See supra notes 110-28 and accompanying text. 
265 See id. 
266 See grmerally Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 412. 
267 See S. REp. No. 95-127, at 99 (1977); LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
AMENDMENTS OF 19771473 (1978). 
268 See supra notes 87-118 and accompanying text. 
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quirement is still not necessarily entitled to an award.269 As the defen-
dants correctly asserted in Steel Co., courts continue to possess wide 
discretion in determining the appropriateness of making an award. 270 
This discretion, however, should be guided by the legislative history of 
the fee-shifting provisions and governed by principles of equity, which 
defendants routinely fail to consider when advocating for unfettered 
judicial discretion. In following this reasoning, the courts' discretion 
must be narrowed to preserve the viability of citizen suits in environ-
mental enforcement. Defendants argue that Congress provided no 
explicit factors to guide the courts' discretion. While this is true, the 
legislative history offers deeper insight into the purpose of the provi-
sions, which can aid the courts' determination of appropriate attor-
neys' fees awards. 
Although the courts have discretion in the awarding of attorneys' 
fees, their decisions must remain consistent with the underlying pur-
pose of the fee-shifting provisions. Additionally, although the princi-
ples of equity have not been used frequently to state how courts 
should determine fee awards, equity has still governed the courts' 
practice.271 Even prior to the decision in Ruckelshaus, courts were 
granting fee awards based upon the principles of equity.272 This has 
led courts in many circumstances to grant awards to plaintiffs who 
were not successful, but who furthered the purpose of the statute.273 
Although this practice is now precluded by the Ruckelshaus decision, 
the rationale remains in making decisions about what is an appropri-
ate fee award.274 Furthermore, equity principles are what govern the 
common law awards of fees to defendants when courts determine a 
suit was brought by a plaintiff in bad faith. 
In determining the appropriateness of a fee award, courts must 
consider whether the award would be fundamentally fair.275 Some 
commentators believe that litigants should be awarded fees if they 
have provided a public benefit unless it would be unfair to make such 
an award.276 Under this theory, defendants argue that they are enti-
269 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 354. 
270 See supra notes 87-110 and accompanying text. 
271 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 
1973). 
272 See id. 
273 See id. 
274 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 352; Hensley v. Eckerhart, 462 U.S. 424, 
430-434 (1983). 
275 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 357-58. 
276 See id. at 356. 
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tIed to fees when they provide a public benefit as the prevailing 
party.277 Others contend that defendants should only be awarded fees 
if they were forced to defend a frivolous or harassing suit; otherwise, it 
goes against fundamental notions of fairness. 278 The latter argument 
is consistent with the legislative intent behind the attorneys' fees pro-
visions. It would be fundamentally unfair and would undermine the 
citizen suit provisions of environmental legislation to force citizens to 
pay defendants' fees in suits which were not found to be frivolous, 
harassing, or unreasonable. 
Fee awards are also considered a punishment to defendants for 
violating federal law. 279 When defendants are found not guilty, mean-
ing the court found they did not violate the law, equity holds that they 
should not be punished for defending that suit-they should not pay 
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. This is essentially what the Supreme Court 
held in Ruckelshaus.280 When plaintiffs bring a valid citizen suit, the 
underlying reason is presumably to advance the public welfare.281 
Even if they lose, their purpose was to protect the public and the'envi-
ronment. 282 In following this rationale, awarding defendants attor-
ney's fee when they simply prevail would unnecessarily punish the 
plaintiffs-the citizens-for bringing that suit. This was clearly not the 
intent of the attorneys' fees provisions of citizen suits. 283 
Basing an award of fees upon the principles of equity would not 
only restrict the recovery of fees for defendants, but also would limit 
the recovery of fees by plaintiffs to only when it is fair or equitable. 
Thus, fees should not be awarded to unsuccessful plaintiffs as that 
would not be equitable, and would violate the courts' fundamental 
notions of fairness. Additionally, the award of fees should decrease 
correspondingly with the amount of success the plaintiff achieves. A 
plaintiff achieving minimal success should not be able to recover all 
its fees from the defendant. Likewise, a plaintiff's success on issues not 
relating to a violation of the statute should also be restricted to keep 
the award equitable. 
277 See Steel Co, Brief, supra note 5, at 2-6, 
278 See Ruckelshaus, 463 V,S, at 685; see also supra notes 169-79 and accompanying text, 
279 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 358. 
280 See Ruckelshaus, 463 V.S. at 680, 
281 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. 
282 See id. 
283 See supra notes 68-94 and accompanying text. 
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3. Curtailing Frivolous Suits 
Congress stated specifically the limited circumstances that war-
rant an award of attorneys' fees to defendants in the debates prior to 
the passage of the attorneys' fees provision of the CAA.284 This implies 
that defendants outside of those limited circumstances should not be 
awarded fees.285 It stands to reason that Congress would not have 
stated a particular instance when defendants can be awarded fees if 
they generally can be awarded for merely prevailing. 
Congress discussed the importance of providing a check on citi-
zen suits in order to prevent a potential flood of illegitimate suits in-
tended solely to harass defendants. 286 This was one of the reasons the 
attorneys' fees provision was included in the CAA.287 However, this 
check was intended to curtail frivolous suits, not citizen suits in gen-
era1.288 The legislative history of the CAA clearly indicates that allow-
ing defendants to obtain attorneys' fees when frivolous or harassing 
suits are brought will curtail these types of suits.289 Put simply, Con-
gress did not leave open the door for defendants to obtain fees based 
solely on the outcome of the case. To the contrary, members of Con-
gress specifically stated that the fee-shifting provision was intended to 
encourage legitimate suits and discourage illegitimate suits.290 Th~ 
only way this is possible is to allow fees to plaintiffs and defendants 
when it is equitable, which for defendants means that such awards are 
limited to cases which were determined to be frivolous, harassing, or 
unreasonable. 
B. Judicial Precedent 
Defendants continue to fight for attorneys' fees when they are 
the prevailing party, but only one court has awarded a prevailing de-
fendant fees and it did so without any analysis of what standard should 
be applied.291 Although the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether 
the fee-shifting provisions of the environmental statutes allow prevail-
ing defendants to receive awards absent a frivolous or harassing law-
284 See supra notes 110-20 and accompanying text. 
285 See id. 
286 See id. 
287 See id. 
288 See id. 
289 SeeS. REp. No. 91-1196, at 36-39 (1970). 
290 See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 687. 
291 See Sierra Club v. Shell Oil, 817 F.2d 1169, 1176 (5th Cir. 1987); see also supra notes 
106-28 and accompanying text. 
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suit, the vast majority of courts continue to follow the Christiansburg 
standard in which the Supreme Court denied a defendant fees under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 292 Defendants in Steel Co. argued that 
the Christiansburg standard does not apply to EPCRA.293 This cannot 
be the case. The Christiansburg standard should be applicable to all 
fee-shifting provisions of statutes that provide for citizen suits. There 
is nothing about the fee-shifting provision in EPCRA which differenti-
ates it from other environmental fee-shifting provisions or the Civil 
Rights Act's fee-shifting provisions.294 Thus, it should be interpreted 
in the same manner, following the Christiansburg standard. 
The fee-shifting provisions of Title VII and of the environmental 
statutes are similar and have been consistently interpreted in the same 
way.295 Thus, this is a legitimate precedent for courts to apply to all 
similar environmental fee-shifting provisions in citizen suits. Applying 
this precedent limits a given defendant's ability to obtain attorneys' 
fees. There is, however, undoubtedly a need for this restriction. With-
out limiting a defendant's ability to obtain fees, citizen suits would be 
too great a financial risk for citizens to take, and thus, these suits 
would be extremely limited ifnot eliminated as a viable option.296 
Although fee-shifting provisions of other statutes allow for fee-
shifting for both plaintiffs and defendants, these statutes are drasti-
cally different from statutes that allow citizen suits.297 The defendants 
in Steel Co. argued that the fee-shifting provision of EPCRA is more 
similar to the fee-shifting provision of the Copyright Act. 298 Although 
the terms of the provisions are similar, this approach fails to consider 
the underlying fundamental difference between citizen suits and 
other types of suits because of the uniqueness of the plaintiff and the 
nature of the suit in the former context.299 This distinction separates 
environmental statutes from other statutes with fee-shifting provisions 
that allow defendants to obtain fees as the prevailing party. Addition-
ally, the language of EPCRA is similar to the language of other envi-
292 See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 412. 
293 See Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 7-16. 
294 See, e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. § § 7401-7671 (1994); EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1994). 
295 See Stephens, supra note 68, at 498; see also AxLINE, supra note 3, at 8-14 & n.64. 
296 See supra notes 71-87 and accompanying text. 
297 See, e.g., Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1994). The Copyright Act states that "the 
court may ... award a reasonable attorneys' fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs." 
[d. 
298 See generally Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5. Compare EPCRA, 42 U.S.C § II046 (f), lIrith 
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1994). 
299 See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text. 
740 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 27:707 
ronmental statutes, and the Christiansburg standard has routinely been 
applied to those statutes by the courtS.300 Defendants may also argue 
that it is unfair or inequitable to award fees to one side when they 
prevail but not to the other. As discussed above, fee awards should be 
based in equity. However, It does not follow that defendants should 
recover fees merely because they have prevailed-it is rarely equitable 
to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
The award of attorneys' fees has traditionally been grounded in 
equity and should continue to be so grounded. Judges are granted the 
discretion to award fees when "appropriate"-i.e., when it is equita-
ble. To allow otherwise would seriously frustrate the purpose of the 
attorneys' fees provisions, and almost certainly have a chilling effect 
on the employment of citizen suits to enforce environmental legisla-
tion. Attorneys' fees awards playa major role in the ability of citizens 
to bring suit on behalf of the public in an attempt to enforce envi-
ronmentallaws. Without these awards, citizens would have to bear the 
cost of bringing suit themselves, a burden which undermines the 
prospect of citizen suits. 
These same awards also deter citizens from bringing suits which 
are frivolous or harassing by allowing fees to defendants in those par-
ticular circumstances. In order for citizen suits to continue to playa 
vital role in the enforcement of environmental law, prevailing defen-
dants· should not be able to obtain attorneys' fees for merely prevail-
ing. Additionally, judges should not adhere to a set standard of grant-
ing fees to any prevailing plaintiff as individual circumstances may 
suggest that awards, even to prevailing plaintiffs, are not always ap-
propriate. Instead, judges should base their determinations on the 
principles of equity and on the individual facts of the case, and trust 
that the resulting award of fees is fair and just. 
300 Compare EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1l046(f), with Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6972(e) (1994). 
